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This paper aims at studying the impact of land tenure on household’s agricultural productivity in 
Benin. Data used in this study come from EMICOV (Enquête Modulaire Intégrée sur les Conditions 
de Vie des Ménages) collected in 2012 and covered 626 Benin’s farming households. The method 
used is the Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) technic approach. Results show that land certificate 
ownership increases by 0.238 the likelihood of investing in agricultural equipment whereas the 
customary law ownership increases this likelihood by 0.374 compared to households without any 
land ownership (the squatters). Furthermore, the customary law ownership provides farmers with 
more security than land certificate ownership in “Collines” region. Our results suggest that public 
authorities recognise customary rights and reinforce legal land institutions. Finally, the best land 
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The land is an immovable property in nature that 
is a crucial development stake for all nations. It 
represents one of the economic development 
cornerstone of all prosperous country. Therefore, 
in developing countries, land issue is of crucial 
importance due to the significance incidence of 
agriculture on economic growth [1]. 
 
Benin is a west-African country with non-
negligible agricultural potential. In 2013, the 
agricultural sector contributed by 32.7 percent on 
average to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
by 75 percent to government revenues and 
provided about 70 percent of employment [2]. An 
optimal exploitation of the assets of that sector 
could help to sustain the national economic 
growth and also to contribute efficiently fighting 
against food insecurity and poverty. Thanks to 
the dynamism of that sector, Benin is among the 
29 Sub-Saharan African countries that reached 
the Millennium Development Goals related to 
reducing by half the prevalence of undernutrition 
by 2015 [3]. 
 
Nevertheless, the productivity level of almost all 
agricultural products in the country is under the 
world average. Therefore, returns from the major 
productions remain less than world average 
returns. In fact, during the last fifteen years, 
average returns from the major cereals (maize, 
rice and sorghum), are respectively 1.2, 2.4 and 
0.9 tons per hectare [4] compare to the world 
average yield for these cereals are respectively 
4, 3.5 and 2 tons per hectare. This difference 
comes from the fact that agricultural productions 
equipment in Benin remains rough and 
traditional tools. Around 76 percent of cultivated 
land are manually proceeded [2]. 
 
Notwithstanding the huge natural potential and 
agro-ecological of the country, the agricultural 
activity tramples and permanently encounters 
land issue. Recent, statistics indicate that arable 
lands are about 33.26 percent in 2010 while 
several farmers are deprived of arable land. In 
fact, the majority of unexploited land belongs to 
third parties for speculative goals. Also, due to 
the high number of farmers without land (or 
holding infertile land) and also some graduated 
with no job, joining agricultural activities, we 
remark a higher density of population in the 
centre of the country, then generating a rapid 
pressure of land tenure, potential source of land 
insecurity for farming household [5]. Moreover, 
with a population of almost 11 million inhabitants, 
a population growth rate of 2.65 percent in 2015. 
The density is around 98 inhabitants per square 
kilometer. The urbanisation programs that are 
likely to increase the relative scarcity of land, is a 
crucial issue for agriculture.  Land issue remains 
intact for Beninese farming households.  Due to 
the low rate1 of land certificates issued compared 
to the potential  available land, legal land 
institutions appear to contribute to the 
precariousness of farming households [6].  
 
Regarding the impact of land security on 
agricultural productivity, empirical results are 
mixed. On the one hand, authors argue that land 
security positively affects long-term investment 
and agricultural productivity. On the other hand, 
some authors argue that land security is not a 
key determinant of agricultural productivity. For 
example, in India, [7] argued that land tenure 
security significantly increases the probability 
and intensity of adoption of improved rice 
technology. Indeed, the author shows that 
farmers who have land rights (legal or 
customary) are more likely to adopt improved 
technologies than tenants-farmers (partial 
tenants and pure tenants). In a recent study in 
Zambia, households with customary tenure are 
less likely to adopt agricultural diversification and 
agroforestry than households with legal status 
[8]. With respect to South African agriculture, [9] 
find a positive relationship between land security 
and input use. For Gambian agriculture, [10] 
conclude that tenure security positively affects 
long-term investments and productivity of 
Gambian farmers. 
 
Dillon and Voena [1] show that among 
households with customary land tenure, there is 
a decline in agricultural investment, which leads 
to lower productivity, especially among zambian 
women who are not entitled to inheritance. In 
addition, in studying food insecurity in Thailand, 
[11] show that tenure security favours 
investments by farm households and 
consequently boosts their agricultural production. 
Similarly, in Burkina Faso, [12] indicate that the 
strengthening of land rights increases the 
investment of farm households in rural areas. 
Finally, in Cameroon, [13] show that land 
security significantly affects the investment 
decisions of farming households and 
consequently their productivity. For these 
authors, the possession of legal rights and 
customary rights results in an increase in the 
                                                          











probability of acquiring modern equipment by 
around 0.35 and 0.47 respectively compared to 
squatters. In a similar vein, a study conducted in 
Ghana by [14] shows that land-secure 
certificates holders invest more in the fertility of 
their soil in order to increase their agricultural 
productivity. 
 
However, [15] in his study in Malawi concludes 
that tenure security is not a key determinant of 
investment and agricultural productivity. 
Similarly, [16] indicate that land rights do not 
have significant effects on investments, land use 
and conservation of soils, use of inputs, and 
access to credit or agricultural yields. In addition, 
[17] indicate that the transition from the collective 
rights system to a system of individual rights in 
sub-Saharan Africa does not have a significant 
effect on agricultural productivity. For them, 
agricultural productivity is determined by other 
factors such as the level of technology, access to 
credit, the price of products and inputs, market 
conditions. Finally, [18] shows that despite the 
insecurity of Ethiopia's land tenure, poor people 
are making substantial investments to increase 
their agricultural productivity. 
 
Generally, several studies have addressed the 
issue of land security but only few specifically 
tackled the case of Benin. This paper intends to 
fill this gap by assessing the impact of land 
security on the productivity of farming 
households in Benin. Results show that land 
certificate ownership increases by 0.238 the 
likelihood of investing in agricultural equipment 
whereas the customary law ownership increases 
that likelihood by 0.374 compared to households 
without any land ownership (the squatters). 
Furthermore, the customary law ownership 
provides farmers with more security than land 
certificate ownership in “Collines” region. 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyzethe 
impacts of land tenure on household’s 
agricultural productivity in Benin. Specifically, we 
identify the type of land right that best 
guarantees farmers to optimise the probability of 
investing in agricultural equipment, which 
improves the productivity of farming households. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY  
 
2.1 Study Area 
 
Benin is part of the intertropical zone. The 
latitude ranges from 6°30’ N to 12°30’ N and the 
longitude from 1°E to 3°40’ E. It is limited in the 
North by the River Niger, in the Northwest by 
Burkina-Faso, in the West by Togo, in the East 
by Nigeria, and in the South by the Atlantic 
Ocean. The Benin territory is divided into eight 
Agro-Ecological Zone AEZs. It has three climatic 
zones including the Sudanian zone (9°45' - 
12°25'N), the Sudano-Guinean zone (7°30'- 
9°45'N) and the Guinean zone (6°25'-7°30'N). 
The Sudanian zone (noted zone 1) is 
characterized by a tropical climate with uni-
modal rainfall which extends from 9°45' to 12°25' 
North. There are two seasons: a dry and a rainy 
season. The Sudano-Guinean zone (noted zone 
2), between 7°30' and 9°45' North, is a region of 
climatic transition that is very unstable and 
complex rainfall regimes are subject to the 
influence of the regimes of the south and the 
North. The Guinean zone (noted zone 3) is 
characterized by a subequatorial climate with a 
bi-modal rainfall pattern that covers the entire 
coastal basin, from the coast to the latitude of 7 ° 
30 'North. 
 
Our study covers the 6 municipalities of 
“Collines” department (Bantè, Dassa-Zoumè, 
Glazoué, Ouessè, Savalou and Savè). This 
department was chosen because it is one of the 
departments of the country where agriculture is 
the main activity. In addition, land is a serious 
issue in this region because of the high density 
of the population. 
 
2.2 Presentation of the Model  
 
Theoretical arguments regarding the relationship 
between land security and agricultural 
productivity have been formalised by [19] and 
[20]. In a problem of optimisation of the final 
wealth of farmers, [19] introduces the land risks 
captured by the probability of eviction of 
agricultural households. The authors assume 
that farmers make their investment decision in 
the purpose of maximising their final wealth. 
These farmers have three possibilities including: 
(1) Invest in capital accumulation through 
acquisition of machinery, tractors and 
equipment; (2) choose to invest in landscaping 
through drainage, soil maintenance, etc. (both 
types of investment are partially or totally lost in 
case of eviction); finally, (3) farmers can invest in 
non-farm assets where land risks do not have an 
effect. [20] replace the concept of "private 
property rights" with the notion of "security of 
property" and derive from the maximization of 












),( TSXfC                                            (1) 
 
),,( CTSXfL                                        (2) 
 
),,( CLXfI                                           (3) 
 
),,( ILXfY                                           (4) 
 
In this system, the endogenous variables are 
credit (C), land management (L), variable inputs 
(I) and agricultural yield (Y). Land security (TS), 
characteristics of farmers and their holdings (X) 
are assumed to be exogenous. 
 
Following the work by [20] and [13], we estimate 
the recursive system of equations presented as 
follows: 
 
),( 1 SFXfE                                           (5) 
 
),( 2 EXfI                                              (6) 
),,( 3 IEXfY                                         (7) 
 
Where, SF: land security, E: investments, I: 
variables inputs, Xi: Control variables measuring 
household characteristics and their plots and Y: 
Productivity of farm households. We hypothesise 
that tenure security directly affects investments 
and indirectly variable inputs because of their 
complementarity. Investments and variable 
inputs will subsequently determine the 
productivity of farm households. To avoid a 
possible endogeneity bias caused by the 
unobservable heterogeneity of the farmers, we 
introduce the vector Xi. As [21] pointed out, land 
tenure security must be exogenous in order to 
avoid the endogeneity bias between investment 
and land security. We choose the specification in 
structural form instead of the reduced form 
because it better tests the relative theoretical 



















2.3 Source of Data 
 
Data used in this study are from EMICOV 2-2 
survey in 2012 by INSAE-Benin throughout the 
entire Benin’s territory. We extracted a sample of 
626 farm households from the 6 municipalities of 
“Collines” department (Bantè, Dassa-Zoumè, 
Glazoué, Ouessè, Savalou and Savè). This 
department was chosen because it is one of the 
country’s departments where agriculture is the 
main activity. In addition, land is a serious issue 
in this region because of the high density of the 
population. 
 
2.4 Description of Variables 
 
Since the works of [22] and [20] on tenure 
security, agricultural households are classified 
into different categories called "bundle of land 
rights". This allows the study of the effects of 
each category on investments and productivity of 
farm households. Indeed, in their study, [20] 
constructed categorical variables to capture the 
level of household tenure security. Based on this 
study, [13] defined three (03) categories of land 
security in Cameroon. As [13], we use the three-
category categorical variables presented below: 
 
Legal ownership: According to property rights 
theory, this category confers the highest level of 
security. It includes farmers who own and have 
legal certificate upon the farmed land. 
Household’s farm owners of the land they farm 
have the largest “bundle of land rights”. It is 
assumed that households here have the right to 
transfer their property since they hold a land 
certificate (a legal document). 
 
Customary property: Households in this 
category have a lower level of security than 
households in the first category (Legal 
Ownership). Indeed, not having title of legal 
ownership, the right of transfer property is 
limited. 
 
Squatter: This category includes households 
that exploit land that they do not own. These are 
households that are in free occupation on the 
land on which they do not have any legal or 
                                                          
2  This nationwide survey was funded by the Government           
of Benin, the Danish Cooperation (DANIDA), the            
Millenium Challenge Account (MCA-Benin Program),             
the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ) and the            
United Nations Program for development (UNDP).                     
Data from this survey are available on the site 
http://www.ilo.org/surveydata/index.php/catalog/454/study-
description.  
customary title. Thus, these households are 
potentially in land insecurity because at any time 
they can be removed from the land they exploit. 
 
By comparing the performance of squatters 
(considered potentially in land insecurity) to the 
performance of other households, we can easily 
identify the effects of land tenure security. But to 
avoid a possible endogeneity between land 
security and investment, it should be ensured 
that the security of land rights remains 
exogenous. In other words, households have no 
influence on the “bundle of rights” associated to 
each category and the resulting security. 
According to [20]'s works, the factors that are 
likely to modify the bundle of individuals' rights 
are mainly determined by exogenous forces. We, 
therefore, consider the security of tenure rights 
as exogenous. 
 
2.5 Data Analysis 
 
The equation (5) corresponds to a binary choice 
model that relates long-run investments and 
tenure security (SF). In fact, investment is an 
indicative variable of modern equipment 
acquisition that capture the occurrence or not of 
investments. This equation could be estimated 
by a probit model. As for equation (6), it relates 
short-term investments (I), long-term 
investments and household characteristics as 
well as the characteristics of their lands. This 
equation indicates that land security indirectly 
influences short-term investments through long-
term investments because of their 
complementarity. It represents a classic multiple 
regression model.  
 
Equation (7) is considered as a Cobb-Douglas 
production function relating the productivity level 
(Y) to the investment (E, I). The estimation of 
such a model does not pose any problem at all 
because each of the equations can be estimated 
individually [23]. However, individually estimating 
each equation assumes that the error terms of 
the different equations are independent of each 
other. Which is not always true in reality. 
 
To circumvent this problem, we use the complete 
information Maximum likelihood method for the 
estimation of the recursive system. For this 
purpose, we choose the "Conditional Mixed 
Process" (CMP
3
) technique devisedby [24] which 
has the merit of being general and of taking into 
account a greater diversity in the nature of 
                                                          
3 The CMP is analogous to the generalized probit developed 











endogenous variables (discrete, censored or 
continuous). In addition, this technique is more 
appropriate for recursive models and it allows to 
take into account the cross-relationships that 
may exist between different equations. 
Moreover, [25] indicate that systemic estimation 
procedures generally lead to more efficient 
estimates than the individual estimate of each 
equation. In Benin, barely 5 percent of 
agricultural credit requests are satisfied because 
agricultural activity is considered as a risky
4
 
activity. Beninese farming households use 
personal savings as well as local solidarity 
mechanisms to finance their investments. So like 
[10] and [13], our specification will not take into 
account the credit equation. Because, we 
assume that the credit channel is irrelevant to 
highlight the effects of land tenure security in 
Benin. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
The results of the descriptive statistics of our 
analysis are displayed in Table 1. This Table 
indicates that the agricultural yield is 4503 kg / 
ha for the households in the sample. The sown 
area is on averages 3.46 hectares. Beninese 
farmers are in majority smallholders; over 79% of 
the households in the sample possess less than 
5 hectares. This indicates a very low level of 
investment. For 63% of the households studied, 
the head of the household has no education. 
Agriculture is the main activity of the head of 
household (81 per cent of households), and 84 
percent of them are men, on average aged 46 
years. The average annual expenditure for 
variable inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and 
other expenses) is about 11,944 FCFA5 and only 
33% of households have modern equipment for 
practicing agricultural activities. 
 
In the “Collines” department, the main form of 
land ownership is customary property (Fig. 1). 
Customary institutions still occupy a prominent 
sociological place in households land ownership, 
especially for households in rural areas. Land 
title remains largely unknown to households that 
refer to customary institutions. Only 24 per cent 
of households hold certificates over lands that 
                                                          
4 Banks are reluctant to finance agricultural activities. Indeed, 
they consider this activity too risky because of unpredictable 
climatic hazards. So to protect themselves they require a lot 
of guarantees from their customers. 
5  The FCFA designates the monetary unit of the country 
defined by the parity 1 EURO = 655,957 FCFA. 
belong to them. That rate is 77 per cent for rural 
households and 23 per cent for urban and semi-
urban households. Squatters occupy a 
significant proportion (21 per cent) of the sample, 
which highlights the constraints related to land 
ownership access. In addition, we note that 
women are disadvantaged with regard to land 
rights (see Appendix, Fig. 4). 
 
In the Collines area, customary landowners are 
more productive than other categories of farmers 
(Fig. 2). The areas sown by these households 
are also greater, and on average they devote 
more resources to purchase inputs (Table 1). 
Squatters account for 43 percent of households 
with a higher level of education. This result could 
be explained by the high level of migration of 
unemployed graduates or the out-of-school 
youth in the “Collines” department. In fact, these 
young people practice agriculture by exploiting 
land that does not belong to them [4]. The 
proportion of heads of households with primary 
education is higher for this category (30 percent), 
but is 23 percent and 22 percent respectively for 
legal owners and customary owners (Fig. 5). 
 
In the Benin context, the proportion of 
households with modern facilities is higher for 
customary owners (52 percent) than for legal 
owners (49 percent) and for squatters (23 
percent) (Fig. 3). This would mean that 
customary landowners have as much, if not 
more, incentives to invest than legal owners. 
 
3.2 Empirical Results  
 
From our empirical results, it appears that land 
tenure security positively and significantly affects 
the probability of acquiring modern equipment. 
The coefficients of the legal and customary 
property dummy variables are positive and 
significant at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
thresholds, respectively. For the first equation, 
the computed marginal effects indicate an 
expected effect of 0.238 and 0.374 on the 
probability of acquiring equipment respectively 
for land certificate ownership and the possession 
of customary rights. 
 
Indeed, compared to squatters who permanently 
incur the risk of being ousted, farmers holding 
legal or customary land certificate are rather 
reassured and do not hesitate to buy modern 
equipment to improve their agricultural yields. 
Contrary to the theory of property rights, 
Beninese households with customary rights are 
so confident that they tend to invest more than 
farmers with legal ownership. However,
disparities exist through municipalities
Agricultural households in Savalou and Savè 
tend to invest less in agricultural equipment 
compared to agricultural households in other 
communes. This can be explained by the fact 
that these two municipalities are the poorest of 
the “Collines” department in Benin. 
 
Land use also positively and significantly affects 
the propensity of acquiring modern equipment, 
especially when the main activity of the 
household is agriculture. In fact, large cultivated 
areas often require abundant labour and 
relatively important capital for farmers. The age 
 






Invest 0.49 0.12 
Input 22050 7073 
Productivity 3770 2701 
Wealth -0.44 0.63 
Agecm 48.12 15.62 
Sexecm 1.12 0.32 
Labour 5.37 2.74 
Actprinc 0.93 0.21 
Area 3.45 1.76 
Observations 154 
Source: Author, from EMICOV (2012) data
Fig. 1. Distribution of households according to their land status
Source: Author, from EMICOV (2012) data
 
Fig. 2. Agricultural Productivity of Benin Households













of the head of household negatively affects 
agricultural investments. This negative sign is 
justified by the stylised facts that indicate that 
older farmers are more reluctant to adopt new 
technologies. The household head's 
significant effect. In addition, t
household wealth is key of investment, while 
education does not seem to affect the decision to 
acquire equipment. Indeed, in Benin, access to 
credit is difficult for farm households, in most 
cases, they invest with their own income, usually 
from previous harvests. In general, only farmers 
who have saved a portion of the previous sales 





Mean Std dev Mean Std 
dev 
Mean 
0.51 0.22 0.23 011 0.448 
9964.23 4693 8305 3736 11944.69
4483.62 4369.72 5983.30 5656 4503.68
-0.35 0.63 -0.46 0.7 -0.40 
46.36 14.66 43.6 13.77 46.22 
1.17 0.38 1.14 0.35 1.15 
5.17 2.48 5.46 2.88 5.28 
0.83 0.2 0.56 0.12 0.80 
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Table 2. Result of the estimation of the investment equation 
 
Variables Coefficient Std. dev Z statistic 
Land security 
Legal ownership 0.26 (0.238)*** 0.67 3.97 
Customary property 0. 81 (0.374)* 0.66 1.31 
Squatters -0.091 0.13 -0.78 
Education 
None 0.17** 0.047 -3.88 
Primary -0.025 0.07 0.72 
Secondary -0.051 0.11 0.64 
University 0.15 0.20 0.23 
Wealth 0.066* 0.405 1.64 
Age of household’s head -0.012* 0.01 0.17 
Sex of household’s head 0.503*** 0.97 -5.16 
Sown area 0.249*** 0.018 13.36 
Main activity -0.042 0.04 -11.16 
Municipalities of "collines" department 
Bantè 0.318** 0.12 2.63 
Dassa Zoumè 0.261*** 0.13 2.13 
Glazoué 0.229** 0.11 2.10 
Ouessè 0.711** 0.14 5.22 
Savalou -0.43** 0.13 -2.75 
Savè -0.25* 0.16 2.33 
Constant 1.56 0.66 23.41 
Source: Author from EMICOV (2012) survey 
Note: values in parenthesis represent marginal efects of our variables of interest 
***, **, * (significativity at 1%, 5%, 10%) 
 
Table 3. Result of the estimation of the variable input equation 
 
Variables Coefficient Std. dev Z statistic 
Investment 45.32*** 13.24 2.91 
Education    
Primary 7.13 8.25 0.93 
Secondary 15.16 10.87 1.22 
University 33.98 18.15 4.33 
Wealth 0.04*** 0.01 5.25 
Age of household’s head -0.32 0.25 -2.02 
Sex of household’s head 7.22 8.22 1.23 
Sown area 4.53*** 1.12 5.07 
Labor 3.92*** 0.78 5.18 
Main activity -7.45 7.32 -1.12 
Municipalities of "collines" department 
Bantè 22.08 12.22 2.18 
Dassa Zoumè -15.22 9.78 -1.25 
Glazoué 28.12 12.34 2.30 
Ouessè 29.66 11.14 2.45 
Savalou -10.22 12.96 -0.66 
Savè 10.12 13.22 0.80 
Constant 2.93 18.70 0.22 
Source: Author from EMICOV (2012) survey 
Note: values in parenthesis represent marginal efects of our variables of interest 












In the third equation of our recursive model, we 
capture agricultural productivity in terms of yield 
per hectare. We assume that production is a 
Cobb-Douglas type function. Thus, we adopt the 
log-linear form for its estimation. Results of this 
equation are summarised in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the 
agricultural productivity equation. The results 
indicate that the acquisition of modern 
equipment has a positive impact on productivity. 
The age of the head of household as well as the 
educational variables have no significant effect 
on agricultural output. However, the gender of 
the household head and the main (highly 
agricultural) household activity significantly affect 
the agricultural productivity of households in 
Benin. Concerning financial resources devoted 
to agricultural inputs, their increasing by 10 
percent improves agricultural return by 4.62 
percent. As for the area planted, it negatively 
affects agricultural productivity. Also, all 
variables negatively and significantly affect 
agricultural productivity in all other municipalities 




Fig. 3. Use of modern equipment by households 
Source: Author, from EMICOV (2012) data 
 
Table 4. Result of the estimation of the agricultural productivity equation 
 
Variables Coefficient Std. dev Z statistic 
Investment 0.673*** 13.24 4.91 
Log (input) 0.462*** 0.12 13.22 
Education    
Primary 0.013 0.25 0.93 
Secondary -0.126 0.07 -0.22 
University 0.098 0.15 0.33 
Log (Age of household’s head) -0.32 0.25 0.32 
Sex of household’s head 0.228*** 0.02 3.23 
Log (Sown area) -0.433*** 0.03 -12.07 
Log (Labor) 0.129*** 0.27 4.18 
Main activity 0.361*** 0.37 7.12 
Municipality of "collines" department 
Bantè -0.22** 0.12 2.18 
Dassa Zoumè 0.18*** 0.08 -1.25 
Glazoué -0.32*** 0.07 -2.30 
Ouessè -0.112*** 0.07 -1.45 
Savalou -0.422** 0.09 -4.66 
Savè -0.53*** 0.08 -9.80 
Constant 2.39** 0.25 14.22 
Mixed-process regression                                                         Number Of Obs= 626 
Log likelihood = -429.74                                                            Prob>chi2=0.0000 
                                                                                                  LR chi2(19) =1223.05 
Source: Author from EMICOV (2012) survey 
Note: values in parenthesis represent marginal effects of our variables of interest 
















4. DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Overall, the results of our study indicate that land 
tenure rights captured by land security positively 
impact the agricultural productivity of households 
in Benin by increasing their incentives to invest. 
In fact, agricultural investments have significantly 
improved household productivity. In addition, the 
results indicate that households land certificates 
owners (legal and customary) are more likely to 
acquire modern agricultural equipment than 
households in land insecurity (squatters). In 
reality, households that hold a land title are 
completely confident that the fruits of their 
investments is guaranteed. While, the squatters 
fear to be ousted from their exploitation at any 
time. Our results are similar to those by [13,1] 
and [11]. 
 
However, contrary to property rights theory, 
households with customary rights are more 
productive than those with legal rights in the 
"Collines” department in Benin. In fact, the land 
is considered as an inheritance property that is 
transmitted from father to son and from 
generation to generation. Thus, these 
households suitably invest in their exploitations 
because they are reassured to reap benefit of 
their investment. Moreover, the level of 
education is almost low in this region, which 
could explain the lack of interest of households 
to hold a legal property right. This result is similar 
to those of [17,26] and [20]. For them, the safety 
of farmers is not exclusively guaranteed by the 
possession of legal rights. In addition, the 
Beninese land sector is characterised by visible 
corruption that is likely to reduce the security 
benefits that can be expected from holding a 
land certificate. Indeed, households are rational 
and they arbitrate between the expected gains 
and the costs associated with holding a legal 
land certificate. They, therefore, take the 
decision to acquire a land certificate when the 
expected gains are greater than the costs 
incurred. Knowing the negative effects of 
corruption on expected gains, households prefer 
to settle for customary rights [4]. 
 
Our results indicate that disparities among 
municipalities play an important role in the level 
of productivity and investment decisions of 
farming households. Several factors justify these 
disparities including: unequal access to transport 
infrastructure and agricultural inputs of farmers, 
soil quality, and relative price levels of the major 
factors of production and market imperfections. 
The level of wealth of households plays a crucial 
and positive role. Indeed, an improvement in 
household income allows them to have more 
financial resources to finance their investments. 
Results indicate a negative relationship between 
area sown and agricultural productivity. This 
result is consistent with that of [27] for whom, 
due to imperfections in the labour market, there 





This paper aims at studying the impacts of land 
tenure on household’s agricultural productivity in 
Benin. We hypothesise that land security plays a 
key role in productivity and the incentive to invest 
in households’ farm. First, our results show that 
holding a land title increases the probability of 
investing in agricultural equipment by 0.238 
while holding customary rights increases it by 
0.374 compared to households without any 
rights (squatters). In fact, land security directly 
increases the investment decisions of 
agricultural households and indirectly the use of 
agricultural inputs, which, in turn, significantly 
impacts the level of agricultural productivity. 
Secondly, we show that the possession of 
customary rights guarantees the safety of 
farmers more than the possession a land title in 
the "Collines” department in Benin. 
Administrative burdens, ignorance of the 
importance of land certificates, costly procedures 
and corruption that undermines land institutions 
are factors that explain this result. Our results 
suggest that public authorities recognise 
customary rights and reinforce legal land 
institutions.  Finally, a better structure of the land 
market would reduce the difficulties related to 
access to land, and inequalities in the distribution 
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Table 5. Description of study variables 
 
Variables Names Definitions  
Endogenous 
Investment Invest Binary variable coded as follows: 1 if the household has 
modern equipment and 0 otherwise 
Inputs Input Current operating expenses in FCFA for the purchase of 
commercial and other inputs (seeds, fertilisers, wage 
labor) 
Productivity Productivity The value of the yield per hectare obtained by dividing the 
total value of production in kilograms by the area 
harvested 
Exogenous 
Expérience agecm The age of household’s head is retained as proxy of the 
experience 
Education Educ The education level of household’s head is a qualitative 
variable that takes four modalities:1 = none, 2= primary, 
3= secondary et 4= university 
Wealth index Wealth Index that varies between -1 and 2 with an average level 
of richness if -0.5 to 1; poorer if -1 to -0.5 and richer if 1 to 
2. 
Sexe sexcm Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the household’s 
head is a man and 0 otherwise 
Labour force Labor Variable captured by the number of people who usually 
worked on the farm 
Main activity Actprinc Binary variable that takes 1 if the activity of household’s 
head is agriculture and 0 otherwise 
Sown area Area Sown Area in hectare (ha) 
Municipality Municipality Dummy which takes 6 modalities: Bantè, Dassa Zoumè, 
Glazoué, Ouessè, Savalou and Savè  
Ownership security 
 
Secufon Categorical variable that takes 3 modalities: Legal 
ownership (prleg), customary property (prcout) et squatter 
(squat). Indicator variables will be used for this variable. 
Productivity is expressed in kg / ha and inputs are in CFA francs 




Fig. 4. Distribution of land ownership rights by sex of household’s head 


















Fig. 5. Distribution of Land Ownership Rights by Gender of Household’s head 
Source: Author, from EMICOV (2012) data 
 
Table 6. Distribution of households by municipality 
 
Municipaly Observations Legal ownership Customary property Squatters  
Bantè 81 26 44 11 
Dassa Zoumè 135 34 51 50 
Glazoué 109 24 83 2 
Ouessè 100 39 44 17 
Savalou 119 15 79 25 
Savè 82 16 41 25 
Source: Author, from EMICOV (2012) data 
 
Table 7. Distribution of the land right of households according to their living environment 
 
 Legal ownership Customary property Squatter 
Urbun 34 67 34 
Rural 120 275 96 
Source: Author, from EMICOV (2012) data 
 
Table 8. Distribution of the land right of households according to the level of education 
 
 Legal ownership  Customary property Squatter 
None 110 200 83 
Primary 36 101 28 
Secondary 7 38 15 
University 1 2 4 
Source: Author, from EMICOV (2012) data 
 
Table 9. Some Financing Modalities for Beninese Farm Households 
 
Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7 Source 8 








NGOs Parents / 
Friends / 
Neighbors 
Source: EMICOV, 2012 
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